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NOTE
UNITED STATES V. DICKERSON: WILL IT BE THE PROVERBIAL
STRAW THAT BREAKS MIRANDA'S BACK?
INTRODUCTION
You have the right to remain silent, anything you say can and will be used
against you in a court of law. You have the right to consult with an attor-
ney and to have your attorney present during questioning, if you cannot
afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you.'
These words are common-place in American society; no less than a
modem American custom. One can scarcely argue that television and mov-
ies have not aggrandized and made more familiar to the general citizenry the
contents of the warnings which police must give when "reading you your
rights." The custom finds its origin in the United States Supreme Court case,
Miranda v. Arizona,2 where the Court established strict guidelines for police
to follow when taking a criminal suspect into custody for questioning.3
Miranda is a landmark case and its holding encompasses what has now be-
come the infamous Miranda Rights.' These rights consist of a set of manda-
tory warnings that must be given to all persons placed in custody and inter-
rogated by police Since the Miranda decision, however, many courts have
whittled away much of the protective shield that was seemingly intended by
the Justices in 1966.6
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,444 (1966).
2. Id.
3. See id.
4. See id. In fact, one attorney recounted that his mother sent him a copy of the news ar-
ticle reporting the death of Ernesto Miranda in a bar room brawl in Arizona. His mother's
comment written at the bottom said: "Charlie, isn't it a shame that someone would do this to
him after all he has done for us?" Charles H. Whitebread, San Diego Bar Bri Lecture (June
19, 1999).
5. See id. at 436.
6. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, (1994) (holding that if a suspect's request
for an attorney is ambiguous or equivocal, the officers have no duty to cease interrogation);
see also Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (holding that a statement taken after the police
fail to honor suspect's invocation of the right to an attorney may be used for impeachment
purposes); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (holding that a statement taken without
proper Miranda warnings can be used to impeach); People v. Peevy, 17 Cal. 4th 1184 (1998),
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 595 (1998) (No. 98-6125) (concluding that a statement taken in pur-
poseful and calculated violation of Miranda Rights is nevertheless admissible for impeach-
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The most recent case narrowing Miranda is United States v. Dickerson.7
After a lengthy analysis, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that
18 U.S.C.A. Section 35018 controls the admissibility of confessions in fed-
eral courts, preempting the judicially created Miranda doctrine.9 Section
3501 aims at doing away with Miranda's irrebuttable presumption-a pre-
sumption making confessions inadmissible when obtained without the pro-
scribed set of warnings."0 In place of Miranda's irrebuttable presumption, is
a much broader test that allows a judge to weigh five factors when determin-
ing whether it is appropriate for a particular confession to be admitted as
evidence of guilt."
At present, the rule in the Fourth Circuit regarding the admissibility of
custodial interrogations is the common law voluntariness rule enunciated in
Section 35012 The rule states that if a confession is given voluntarily, then
it is admissible as evidence of guilt in the prosecutor's case-in-chief. 3 In
truth, the voluntariness test involves a "totality of the circumstances" analy-
sis. 4 The entire issue of admissibility rests in the hands of the reviewing
judge, but the absence of any factor is not conclusive on the issue of volun-
tariness. 5
Thus, Miranda and Section 3501 are complete polar opposites of one
another. Miranda provides a bright-line rule that confessions obtained absent
ment purposes).
7. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 1999 WL
593195 (Dec. 6, 1999) (No. 99-5525).
8. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3501 (West 1985). Two years after Miranda was decided, a disgruntled
Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 that included §
3501.
9. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 672.
10. See id. at 687.
11. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3501(b). Section 3501 provides in relevant part:
Admissibility of confessions:
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consid-
eration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including
(1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the
confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such de-
fendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which he
was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether or not such defen-
dant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and that
any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant
had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and
(5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when
questioned and when giving such confession. The presence or absence of any of
the above-mentioned factors to be taken into consideration by the judge need not
be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.
Id. (emphasis added).
12. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 672.
13. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3501(a).
14. See id. § 3501(b).
15. See id.
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the proscribed warnings are per se inadmissible. 6 Section 3501, on the other
hand, abolishes Miranda's irrebuttable presumption and adopts the common
law "totality of the circumstances" approach. 7
The Supreme Court's decision to review the Dickerson case brings great
anticipation. 8 At stake are issues that have been debated in American juris-
prudence for over three decades concerning which rule of law governs cus-
todial interrogations-Section 3501 or Miranda." Although reluctant to ad-
dress the conflict between Miranda and Section 3501 in the past,"0 the Fourth
Circuit's holding in Dickerson required the Supreme Court to grant certio-
rari, in order to put an end to this lengthy debate.2
Miranda is still a viable doctrine and maintains the relevant standard by
which a person's Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-
incrimination is safeguarded.2" This note 3 will discuss both doctrines, but
16. See generally Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
17. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 687. The Senate Report noted that Miranda "is the case to
which the bill is directly addressed." 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2112. Furthermore, the legislative
history describes that section 3501's specific purpose was to vitiate Miranda's irrebuttable
presumption in favor of the voluntariness approach. See id.
18. The issues are viewed as so important, that in a recent front page article, written be-
fore the Court granted certiorari, it was reported that the Supreme Court was expected to take
the matter up for review, and that the announcement might come as early as October, 1999.
See Richard Carelli, Miranda Warning Heads for Crucial High Court Airing, S.D. UNION
TRm., July 22, 1999, at Al. Consistent with the articles forecast the Court did grant certiorari.
19. See generally Alfredo Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, Was It Overruled, Or Is It Irrele-
vant?, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 461 (1998); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 435 (1987); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial
Benefits and Vanishing Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U.L. REV. 500 (1996); Paul G. Cassell &
Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda's Harmful
Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1055 (1998); Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No
Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda's Defenders, 90 Nw. U.L. REv. 1084 (1996); Paul G.
Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U.L. REV. 387 (1996).
20. In 1994, the Supreme Court side-stepped the conflict between Miranda and § 3501
because a majority of the Court felt constrained, due to prudential limitations on the Court,
from deciding the case on an issue not raised at the lower level. See Davis v. United States,
512 U.S. 452 (1994).
21. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 677, cert. granted, 1999 WL 593195 (Dec. 6, 1999) (No.
99-5525).
22. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment reads in its entirety as follows:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, un-
less on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due proc-
ess of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compen-
sation.
Id.
23. This note will not address the issue of whether Congress can or cannot validly over-
rule a judicially created rule through legislative enactment, that is the subject for a different
article. Yet, it has been said that, "Congress has the power to overrule judicially created rules
3
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will conclude that the Miranda doctrine should prevail over the voluntari-
ness rule in Section 3501. Because the Section 3501 test depends on judicial
discretion, the chances for inconsistent application poses a threat of height-
ened confusion in the area of custodial interrogation. ' Furthermore, earlier
Supreme Court decisions have appropriately narrowed the scope of
Miranda,' while other, more recent opinions have reaffirmed the Miranda
doctrine. 6 For these reasons the Supreme Court should hold that the Section
3501 test provides too much potential for unjust results. Therefore, the Court
should invalidate Section 3501 and specifically reaffirm Miranda.
This Note is divided into three main parts. Part I discusses Dickerson,
and will first focus on the Fourth Circuit's appraisal of sua sponte review.
It will be argued that the Fourth Circuit was justified, and even correct, in
dealing with the Section 3501 issue even though it was not raised at the
lower level. The discussion will then turn to the Dickerson court's analysis
supporting a return to the common law voluntariness rule. Part II begins by
setting forth the history and holding of Miranda. It also includes a discussion
of the Miranda procedures and why the Court concluded strict procedures
are necessary. Part I presents the subsequent line of cases that properly nar-
row the holding in Miranda, as well as the recent Supreme Court cases that
reaffirm it, thus allowing Miranda to continue as a viable standard. Part IV
presents the conclusion that continued support of the Miranda Rights, is the
wiser course for the Supreme Court to follow.
I. THE DICKERSON DECISION
A. The Need for Sua Sponte Review
Since its enactment over thirty years ago, Section 3501 has been of little
consequence because of the Government's failure to invoke its provisions
and the judiciary's continued promotion of Miranda.' This statement cer-
of evidence and procedure that are not required by the Constitution." Dickerson, 166 F.3d at
672 (citing Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426 (1996); Palermo v. United States, 360
U.S. 343, 345-48 (1959)). "Thus, whether Congress has the authority to enact § 3501 turns on
whether the rule set forth by the Supreme Court in Miranda is required by the Constitution."
Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 672.
24. Because of its ambiguity and "its subtle mixture of factual and legal elements," the
"voluntariness" test "virtually invited [trial judges] to give weight to their subjective prefer-
ences" and "discouraged review even by the most conscientious appellate judges." Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Confession and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REv. 865, 869-70 (1981).
25. See supra note 6.
26. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 694 (1993) (reaffirming Miranda's bright-
line test over the "totality of the circumstances" approach in habeas corpus cases); Minnick v.
Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990) (reaffirming the rule in Miranda and specifically holding
that once a request for counsel has been made all interrogation must cease, and cannot be re-
initiated without the presence of counsel).
27. Sua Sponte is defined as "of his or its own will or motion; voluntarily; without
prompting or suggestion." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1424 (6th ed. 1990).
28. See Eric D. Miller, Should Courts Consider 18 USC § 3501 Sua Sponte?, 65 U. C.
[Vol. 36
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tainly begs the question: Why is the Government failing to enforce a duly
enacted statute of Congress? One commentator suggests two reasons why
the Department of Justice acts so cautiously regarding Section 3501's en-
forcement.29 First, government lawyers are apt to feel that Miranda's bright-
line rules provide clearer guidelines for police to follow than does section
3501's "totality of the circumstances" provision." Second, the Government
may have doubts as to the constitutionality of Section 3501. They may there-
fore be hesitant to risk reversal of a criminal conviction in a case where the
statute was relied on." These two reasons may explain why the Department
of Justice is slow to enforce the statute. It does not, however, adequately ex-
plain why the Department of Justice will not itself ask the Supreme Court to
clarify whether Section 3501 is the appropriate standard to use when deter-
mining the admissibility of a confession.32
Ironically, in a fairly critical concurring opinion in Davis v. United
States,33 Justice Scalia stated, "[t]his is not the first case in which the United
States has declined to invoke Section 3501 before us, nor even the first case
in which that failure has been called to its attention."' Even though he rec-
ognized the need to resolve the conflict between Miranda and Section 3501,
Justice Scalia agreed that invoking Section 3501 was improper in that case
because of prudential limitations on the Court.35 Presumably, the Section
L. RaV. 1029 (1998) (concluding that it is necessary for courts to consider the issue sua
sponte).
29. See id. at 1036-37.
30. See id. This point was further confirmed during an interview with one of San Diego's
City Attorneys, Elmer Heaps. Mr. Heaps stated that he would always proceed under Miranda
because the clear lines under that rule helps the prosecutor fulfill "his sacred duty to see that
fairness and justice are accomplished, regardless of whether that means no conviction." Inter-
view with Elmer Heaps, San Diego Prosecuting Attorney's Office, in San Diego, Cal. (July
27, 1999).
31. See Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement by the President Upon Signing the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 in 1 PRES. PUB. PAPERS 725-28 (1968-69). Presi-
dent Johnson wrote to Senator Mansfield, recommending that the Senator "not encumbe[r] the
legislation with provisions raising grave constitutional questions." 114 Cong. Rec. S12450
(May 9, 1968) (statement of Senator Mansfield).
32. See Letter from John C. Keeney, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to all United
States Attorneys and all Criminal Division Section Chiefs (Nov. 6, 1997) (noting that "[tihe
Department has not yet decided whether it would ask the Supreme Court in an appropriate
case to overrule or modify Miranda.") (citing United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th
Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 1999 WL 593195 (Dec. 6, 1999) ((No. 99-5525) & n.16) [hereinaf-
ter Letter from Keeney].
33. 512 U.S. 452,462-65 (1994).
34. Id. at 463.
35. See id. at 464. Justice Scalia argued that because the limitation is based on prudential
concerns, there are times when it is appropriate and necessary to consider issues not briefed
by counsel. See id. Prudential constraints act as limitations on the Supreme Court's powers of
review. For example, mootness is a doctrine that requires there to be ajusticiable claim during
the entire pendency of the case.
The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of par-
ties having adverse legal interests. It must be a real and substantial controversy
5
Sovereign: NOTE -- United States v. Dickerson: Will It Be the Proverbial Str
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1999
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
3501 issue in Davis was moot because it was not raised at the lower level,
thereby placing it beyond the Supreme Court's powers of review.16 Justice
Scalia concluded in Davis, however, that the Court would have to consider
the implication of Section 3501 the next time the statute applied to the facts
of a case."
The Fourth Circuit did in Dickerson what the Supreme Court was un-
willing to do in Davis. Thus, it is clear the Fourth Circuit considered Justice
Scalia's concurring opinion in Davis an invitation. The Dickerson Court re-
fused to ignore the Section 3501 issue simply because the prosecution had
not raised it as a basis for admissibility.38 The Dickerson Court unreservedly
pointed out the only reason Section 3501 was not raised was because the
U.S. Attorney's Office was forbidden from doing so by the Department of
Justice. 9 Janet Reno, the United States Attorney General, acting pursuant to
2 U.S.C.A. Section 288,4' informed Congress that the Department of Justice
was unwilling to defend the constitutionality of Section 3501." In a some-
what irritated tone, the Dickerson Court responded by stating, "[flortunately,
we are a court of law and not politics. Thus, the Department of Justice can-
not prevent us from deciding this case under the governing law simply by
refusing to argue it."42
The historical backdrop of Section 3501's limited use suggests that
strong political opposition, and skepticism from practitioners, are among the
admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distin-
guished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state
of facts.
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 59-66 (5th ed. 1995).
36. Although the Davis Court did not specifically address the issue of mootness, it is im-
plied in Justice Scalia's concurring opinion when he states, "it is proper, given the Govern-
ment's failure to raise the point, to render judgement without taking account of § 3501."
Davis, 512 U.S. at 464.
37. See id. Justice Scalia continued by commenting, "[b]ut I will no longer be open to the
argument that this Court should continue to ignore the commands of § 3501 simply because
the Executive declines to insist that we observe them." Id.
38. See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 672 (4 Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 1999
WL 593195 (Dec. 6, 1999) (No. 995525).
39. See Letter from Keeney, supra note 32 (forbidding "federal prosecutors [from]
rely[ing] on the voluntariness provision of Section 3501.") Id.
40. 2 U.S.C.A. § 288k (West 1997). Section 288k reads in part as follows:
(b) The Attorney General shall notify the Counsel with respect to any proceeding
in which the United States is a party of any determination by the Attorney General
or Solicitor General not to appeal any court decision affecting the constitutionality
of an Act or joint resolution of Congress within such time as will enable the Senate
to direct the Counsel to intervene as a party in such proceeding pursuant to section
288e of this title.
Id.
41. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 682.
42. Id. at 672 (citing United States Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Independent Ins. Agents of
America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 445-48 (1993)).
[Vol. 36
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causes for its neglect. Beginning with President Lyndon Johnson, who
signed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 into law,
every administration since has done little, if anything, to enforce this legisla-
tive enactment.43 In fact, Attorney General Ramsey Clark gave instructions
to all U.S. Attorneys to rely only on confessions obtained in compliance with
Miranda.' In light of all this, the Dickerson Court was correct for reviewing
the issue sua sponte because without such bold judicial action it is conceiv-
able that this conflict might continue for many more years to come.
The danger in allowing this split among the circuits to prevail is that law
enforcement agents will be using two different rules when conducting custo-
dial interrogations. Differences will be jurisdictional and will depend on the
prevailing law of the agent's jurisdiction. Although this may not cause much
confusion for law enforcement agents, confusion will exist for the people of
the United States. The people of the United States have a justified expecta-
tion that the laws under which they are governed remain uniform and consis-
tent.45 This does not mean that once a law is enacted it can never be changed
or modified. Rather, it simply means that in certain crucial areas of the law,
of which custodial interrogation is one, there must be one rule so confusion
is minimized.46
Thus, in spite of the fact that the Executive branch may have legitimate
reasons for not enforcing the statute over rules crafted by the Supreme
Court, there is equal justification for the judicial activism engaged in by the
Dickerson Court when it reviewed Section 3501 sua sponte.47 The Fourth
Circuit declared that it was not under the same prudential constraints as the
Supreme Court, thereby allowing an inferior court to take up the issue sua
sponte." By doing so, the Dickerson Court eliminated the prudential con-
cerns that troubled the majority in Davis, and made it possible for the Su-
preme Court to squarely address the application of Section 3501 in light of
Miranda.
B. The History of the Common Law Rule
At early common law, confessions were admitted into evidence without
43. See Miller, supra note 28, at 1033-35. President Lyndon Johnson declared a belief
that the statute could be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution and assured that federal
practices would "continue to conform to the Constitution." Id.
44. See Daniel Gandara, Admissibility of Confessions in Federal Prosecutions, 63
GEORGETOWN L.J. 305, 311-12 (1974).
45. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1, reads as follows: "The Citizens of each State shall
be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." Id.
46. It is recognized that from state to state there will be some differences in the law. For
example, the Community Property system prevails in only a handful of states. Nevertheless,
in criminal matters, where the consequences are so dire, there must be a national, uniform rule
of law respecting the rights of suspected criminals.
47. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 682.
48. Seeid.at683.
1999]
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any restrictions whatsoever.49 This rationale persisted, perhaps because the
general and prevailing sentiment was that confessions were considered in-
dispensable items of evidence-often characterized as the best evidence of
guilt." But, as early in English jurisprudence as 1783, judicial sentiment
changed regarding confessions because of the questionable techniques em-
ployed to secure some confessions.' The sentiment was that confessions in-
duced by threats or actual torture were considered unreliable and, therefore,
were rendered inadmissible at trial. 2 After these protective changes were
added to the early English doctrine, the rule, simply stated, allowed the use
of a confession so long as it was obtained voluntarily. 3 The English common
law doctrine remained fairly static and was specifically adopted into Ameri-
can jurisprudence in the 1884 case, Hopt v. Utah.' Yet, thirteen years later,
in Brain v. United States,55 the Supreme Court announced for the first time
that the Fifth Amendment provision guarding against compelled self-
incrimination required confessions to be made voluntarily. 6 This was a criti-
cal juncture in the evolution of confession law in the United States. The
holding in Brain gave constitutional bite to the idea that police must operate
within certain parameters when trying to exact a confession from a suspected
criminal.57
The Supreme Court again augmented the American version of the vol-
untariness doctrine when it relied on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment in Brown v. Mississippi." Through its holding in Brown, the
Supreme Court gave further support to the idea that Constitutional dimen-
sions abound in the area of government-conducted interrogations. 9 Thereaf-
ter, and with little variance for nearly 180 years, the rule prior to Miranda,
governing the admissibility of confessions, was that confessions voluntarily
made were admissible as evidence of guilt.' The Miranda decision created a
49. See generally Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REv. 935 (1966).
At early common law, evidence of torture did not change whether the confession could be
admitted into evidence. See id. at 954.
50. See S. REP. No. 10 97, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2124.
51. See The King v. Rudd, 168 Eng. Rep. 160 (K.B. 1783) (holding that confessions
"forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear," ought to discredited).
Id.
52. See id.
53. See Regina v. Garner, 169 Eng. Rep. 267 (Ct. Crim. App. 1848); Regina v. Baldry,
169 Eng. Rep. 568 (Ct. Crim. App. 1852).
54. 110 U.S. 574, 584-85 (1884) (holding that a confession is reliable and, therefore,
admissible if not secured by threat or promise).
55. 168 U.S. 537 (1884).
56. See id.
57. See id. at 574.
58. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
59. In Miranda, this constitutional dimension surrounding custodial interrogations and
confessions became the critical basis of the Court's analysis, and upon which its holding rests.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 459-60 (1966).
60. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 464 (1994) (noting that prior to Miranda,
[Vol. 36
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bright-line rule for determining the trustworthiness of confessions and their
ultimate admissibility.6'
C. A Proposed Return to the Voluntariness Test
When Congress enacted Section 3501 as part of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, it was clear that its intent was to over-
rule Miranda.62 The legislative committee responsible for the bill became
convinced that, "the rigid and inflexible requirements of the majority opin-
ion in the Miranda case are unreasonable, unrealistic, and extremely harmful
to law enforcement."'63 The Honorable Alexander Holtzoff, U.S. district
judge for the District of Columbia, testified that strict adherence to
Miranda's proscribed warnings creates severe impediments to effective law
enforcement efforts.64 As enacted, the statute provides in pertinent part that
"a confession... shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given."'65
On its face, Section 3501 seems to comport with the ideals of Miranda-that
protecting against compelled confessions is of tantamount importance. Yet,
the real danger of Section 3501 lies within subsection (b) of the statute,
which sets forth the test for determining whether or not a confession was
made voluntarily.67 The test is a "totality of the circumstances" approach
conducted by the court, which weighs the following five factors: (1) the
amount of time that transpired between arrest and arraignment; (2) whether
the suspect understood the nature of the alleged offense; (3) whether the sus-
pect was advised of the right to remain silent and that anything said would
be used against him; (4) whether the suspect was advised prior to question-
"voluntariness vel non was the touchstone of admissibility of confessions") Id.
61. See generally Susan R. Klein, Miranda Deconstitutionalized: When The Self-
Incrimination Clause And The Civil Rights Act Collide, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 417, 419 (1994).
62. See S REP. No. 1097, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2112, 2141.
63. Id. at 2132.
No matter how much money is spent for upgrading police departments, for modem
equipment, for research and other purposes encompassed in title I, crime will not
be effectively abated so long as criminals who have voluntarily confessed their
crimes are released on mere technicalities. The traditional right of the people to
have their prosecuting attorneys place in evidence before juries the voluntary con-
fessions and incriminating statements made by defendants simply must be re-
stored.
Id. at 2123.
64. See id. at 2130.
65. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3501(a).
66. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442. "These precious rights were fixed in our Constitution
only after centuries of persecution and struggle. And in the words of Chief Justice Marshall,
they were secured 'for ages to come, and ... designed to approach immortality as nearly as
human institutions can approach it." Id. (quoting Cohens v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 19
U.S. 264 (1821)).
67. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3501(b); see also Schulhofer, supra note 24, at 869-70, and ac-
companying text.
1999]
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ing of the right to consult with counsel; and (5) whether the suspect was
without counsel during questioning."
One might recant by asking, "What's wrong with this test?" Admittedly,
the answer would have to be "nothing." Except, at the end of subsection (b),
the court is instructed that "[t]he presence or absence of any of the above-
mentioned factors to be taken into consideration.., need not be conclusive
on the issue of voluntariness of the confession."69 So now the question be-
comes: How many factors must be present? Or, how many of the factors can
be missing and the confession still be considered voluntary? There is no
clear answer. However, Dickerson represents an example of a situation
where no warnings were given prior to the time when the incriminating
statements were made," and the confession was nonetheless deemed volun-
tary under the Section 3501 test.7'
Indeed, the Supreme Court has already recognized the allusiveness of
the voluntariness test. Justice O'Connor in, Miller v. Fenton, noted that
"[tjhe voluntariness rubric has been variously condemned as 'useless,' 'per-
plexing,' and 'legal "double-talk."72 At the very least, Section 3501 rests on
notably tenuous ground.
II. THE MIRANDA DECISION
A. The History and Holding
When Miranda was decided in the mid 1960s, America was experienc-
ing a renewed interest in civil rights. The citizenry expected big changes po-
litically, economically, and legally.73 Many of those expectations were real-
ized by the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.'4 Amid this era of
68. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3501(b).
69. Id.
70. See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 675. There was some controversy over
whether Dickerson was read his rights before or after making his statement to Special Agent
Lawlor and Detective Durkin. The district court questioned the credibility of Special Agent
Lawlor and found that "Dickerson was not advised of his Miranda rights until after he had
completed his statement to the government." Id. at 676.
7 1. See id. at 692-93. However, at least one district court has already seized on the ruling
in Dickerson. See United States v. Tapia-Mendoza, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1256-57 (C.D. Utah,
March 10, 1999) (agreeing with Dickerson and holding that § 3501 is the applicable rule to
use when determining the admissibility of a confession).
72. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
73. See Garcia, supra note 19, at 456-69 (commenting on the fact that many legal com-
mentators do not pay enough attention to the social conditions that were prevalent during the
Miranda era. He further argues that this aspect of the analysis is crucial to understanding how
the Warren Court justified its holding in Miranda).
74. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 [hereinafter Civil Rights]; see also 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), which was amended in 1979, but is derived from act of April 20, 1871,
ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13. The 1979 amended statute reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, or any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
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intense social change, reports of police corruption and brutality towards
criminal suspects were commonplace when Miranda was decided.75 During
the course of its Miranda opinion, the Supreme Court exposed the findings
of both the Wickersham Commission76 and the Commission on Civil
Rights.77 It engaged in an in-depth, nationwide examination of general law
enforcement practices surrounding custodial interrogations." Much of what
was brought to light concerning custodial interrogations was not merely
condoned by law enforcement agencies. Instead, it was formally adopted and
taught to officers by these agencies, with the intent to exact greater results
during the course of an interrogation.79 Thus, in response to the apparent
abuses occurring within the confines of police station interrogation rooms,
the Supreme Court held "the prosecution may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the de-
fendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
secure the privilege against self-incrimination."8 Seeing that police were not
afraid to use a myriad of abusive physical and psychological tactics to secure
confessions,"' the court proscribed a set of specific warnings. The purpose of
the warnings is to apprise a suspect of his rights while, at the same time, set-
ting certain fixed parameters for law enforcement agents to follow in the per-
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be consid-
ered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Id.
75. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 446 (1966) (citing People v. Portelli, 15
N.Y.2d 235 (1965) (finding the police brutally beat, and placed lighted cigarette butts on the
back of a witness to secure an incriminating statement against a third party suspect)).
76. See id. at 447 (citing IV National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement,
Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement (1931)). The Wickersham Report was the prod-
uct of a Presidential Commission created in the early 1930s, which reported its findings of
police brutality and questionable interrogation practices directly to Congress.
77. See id. (citing 1961 Comm'n on Civil Rights Rep., Justice, pt. 5, 17). In 1961, the
Commission on Civil Rights found evidence that police were still using physical force to se-
cure confessions. It discovered incidents of brutal physical beating, use of cigarette butts, ex-
tended incarceration in conjunction with deprivation of food, and many other deplorable prac-
tices. See id.
78. See id. at 448-49. The court reviewed police manuals which outlined various tactics
and procedures used generally around the country. In addition, the court noted that the texts
professedly contained the most enlightened and effective means known to improve the suc-
cess of interrogations and increase the likelihood of obtaining a confession. See id.
79. See id. at 457. "It was clear, to the majority at least, that all these tactics were em-
ployed "for no other purpose than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner." Id.
80. Id. at 444.
81. See id. at 448 (citing Chambers v. State of Florida, 309 U.S. 227). Modernly, how-
ever, the more common form of abuse is psychological. "The blood of the accused is not the
only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition." Civil Rights, supra note 74.
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formance of their duties. 2
The safeguards enunciated by the court were and remain: (1) that the
suspect has the right to remain silent, (2) that anything said can and will be
used against the suspect in court, (3) that the suspect has the right to consult
with an attorney before questioning, and to have him present during ques-
tioning, and (4) that the suspect has the right to have an attorney appointed if
the suspect cannot afford an attorney.83 Relying on precedent,8' the Court re-
affirmed that the basis for its holding was fashioned on constitutional
grounds.' For this basis of constitutional authority, the court relied on the
Fifth Amendment Privilege, which provides that no person should be forced
to testify against himself. 6 The Court was concerned with the potential for
suspects undergoing custodial interrogation to feel compelled to make
statements as a result of the inherent pressure of the interrogation environ-
ment.87 The Miranda Court specifically discussed several coercive interroga-
tion techniques."8 First, the interrogator engages the suspect by sympathizing
with him. 9 For instance, the interrogator may begin by suggesting that the
suspect certainly did not go looking for trouble, but was merely trying to
protect himself.' This tactic normally evokes some statement that the prose-
cutor can use to negate a self-defense theory.9 Second, is the "Mutt and Jeff'
routine." This is the bad cop, good cop play-acting technique.93 The bad cop
82. One commentator has stated that, based on his years of experience as an F.B.I. in-
structor, he believes it is essential to law enforcement that clear guidelines be established for
officers to follow. See Charles H. Whitebread, The Burger Court's Counter-Revolution h
Criminal Procedure, 24 WASHBuRN L.J. 471 (1985).
83. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468-71.
84. See Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The holding in Escobedo so-
lidified the constitutionality of the right against self-incrimination and the right to an attorney,
even though the holding was based on a Sixth Amendment analysis, as opposed to the Fifth
Amendment analysis in Miranda.
85. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 459-60.
86. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or oth-
envise infamous crime.., nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be witness against
himself... ."Id. (emphasis added).
87. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 456 & n.24. In 1964, a Negro man of limited intelligence
confessed to two brutal murders and a rape, which he did not commit. After learning of this,
the prosecutor was reported as saying, "Call it what you want 'brain-washing, hypnosis,
fright.' They made him give an untrue confession." N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 28, 1965, at 1. A more
recent illustration of the abuses during interrogations occurred in United State v. Van Metre
150 F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 1998). In this case the defendant was held and interrogated for the bet-
ter part of fifty-five hours before being arraigned. The confession was held to be admissible
under the voluntariness test of § 3501 because the length of time between arrest and arraign-
ment is only one factor to be considered. See id. at 348-49. This is exactly the type of a case
that illustrates the potential for abuse under the § 3501 test.
88. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 451-53.
89. See id. at 451-52.
90. See id.
91. Seeid.
92. See id. at 452.
93. See id.
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acts irate and vocally suggests that he will do whatever it takes to get infor-
mation to put the suspect away for life.' When the bad cop leaves the room,
good cop says he will call off bad cop if suspect will cooperate.95 This ploy
also normally evokes some statement through creating a false trust in the
good cop. Third, is good old trickery.96 The most effective technique is the
"reverse line-up."97 Here, a coached witness points out the suspect in a
staged line-up, thereby implicating him in some fictional crime.98 Normally
the suspect will confess to the immediate crime to avoid being wrongfully
associated with the made-up crime."
Even though the Miranda Court painstakingly discussed the evils of
custodial interrogations, it is important to point out that it did not eliminate
the usefulness of all statements made while in the presence of police. In fact,
statements made after a defendant, "knowingly and intelligently waive[s] the
privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed
counsel," remain valid confessions."° But in order to waive one's rights
"knowingly and intelligently" it is essential that the Miranda warnings first
be administered.' The Court reasoned that regardless of the suspect's edu-
cation or background, the warnings are indispensable in order to assure the
suspect knows those rights can be exercised immediately.'" Thus, if a sus-
pect makes a valid waiver and then voluntarily confesses, the confession can
be used without suffering the barring constraints imposed by the self-
incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment. 3
Likewise, the Court made clear that its holding does not force upon po-
lice the duty to become deaf when a confession is truly volunteered."°
Rather, the holding creates and places well defined constraints on law en-
forcement agents seeking to initiate the confessional. 5 If a suspect initiates a
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 453.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 475.
101. Explicit in the majority's opinion is the need for the suspect to be advised of his
rights if a valid waiver is to be established. Without the warnings, it is arguable that a know-
ing and intelligent waiver did not, nor could not take place. See id. at 469.
102. See id.
103. The Court conceded that confessions are an integral part of law enforcement and
statements given freely and voluntarily will continue to be admissible evidence. See id. at
478.
104. For example, if a person walks into a police station and begins telling officers that
he committed a crime, officers are not duty-bound to stop the person from speaking until the
required warnings are administered. See id. The reason for this departure from the require-
ments of Miranda is that the confession is instigated by the defendant and given outside po-
lice custody. See id. It needs to be clear that Miranda applies to conversations initiated by the
police and forced upon a suspect through police custody. See id.
105. See id.
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conversation with a police officer there is no need for the Miranda warnings
because the suspect is either not in custody, not being interrogated, or both." 6
B. The Miranda Procedures
The Miranda Court was fearful that its proscribed warnings would be-
come nothing more than "empty formalities."' 7 The Court recognized that
the police could simply administer the warnings and then continue the inter-
rogation outside the supervision of the suspect's attorney."8 Therefore, in an
effort to combat that fear, the Court provided clear-cut procedures for law
enforcement agents to follow when apprehending a suspect for interrogation
purposes.'" First and foremost, the warnings must be given to everyone un-
dergoing custodial interrogation."0 Any presumption regarding whether the
suspect knows his rights is impermissible."'
Warnings must precede the custodial interrogation in order to assure
that a person can intelligently invoke the privilege."' If at any time a person
invokes his right to remain silent, the police must honor that right by imme-
diately ceasing all interrogation."3 The Court reasoned that if a statement is
given after the suspect has invoked the right to remain silent, such a state-
ment can only be the result of police compulsion."4 Thus, it must be held in-
admissible.'
Likewise, if the suspect invokes the right to consult an attorney, this
right must also be honored immediately."6 No further questioning can take
place until the suspect's attorney is present."7 Such a requirement accom-
plishes two goals: (1) the suspect can give an honest account of his story be-
cause he will be more relaxed when accompanied by counsel; and (2) the
presence of counsel will tend to diminish threats of duress or use of compel-
106. See id.
107. Id. at 466.
108. See id.
109. The Court did not rule out other alternatives. It left open for the States and Congress
to adopt reforms that would assure an equal level of protection as those which it proposed, by
way of its holding in Miranda. See id. at 467.
110. It is pure speculation to engage in an expostfacto assessment of the accused's level
of knowledge or economic wherewithal, because the rights are too important and the warnings
too simple not to be given to everyone. See id. at 469.
111. Seeid.
112. See id.
113. It has been held that after a suspect invokes his right to remain silent the police
nonetheless can recommence questioning later. See Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96 (1975)
(holding that a two hour break between questioning did not violate Miranda, when the suspect
was re-administered the warnings before questioning commenced).
114. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474.
115. See id. at 474, 476.
116. See id. at 474.
117. See id.
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ling police tactics."' In the event the attorney's presence does not satisfy
these goals, the attorney can simply testify about any unlawful tactics used
by the police."9
III. SUBSEQUENT AND APPROPRIATE NARROWING OF MIRANDA
A. Harris, Hass, and Progeny Provide for Limited Use Through
Impeachment
While Dickerson is not alone in its attack on Miranda, it is the latest
clear pronunciation of a growing trend in the area of custodial interrogation
law; a trend with its aim on significantly narrowing or altogether eliminating
Miranda. But ironically, the leading case fueling the controversy is the Su-
preme Court's own case, Harris v. New York." ° There, the Court held that
statements obtained in violation of the required Miranda warnings, while in-
admissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief, are admissible for impeaching
the defendant during cross-examination."'
The Harris Court refused to construe Miranda broadly." It reasoned
that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, which Miranda
was intended to protect, was not intended to provide a shield for the accused
to hide behind when attempting to give perjurious testimony on the stand."
In other words, the accused should not be permitted to use Miranda as a
sword during pre-trial motions to suppress illegally obtained statements, and
thereafter be allowed to commit perjury knowing the statements have been
suppressed. 4 Furthermore, the deterrent effect, which the Miranda ruling
was intended to impose on police with respect to unlawfully obtained state-
ments, is adequately satisfied by applying the exclusionary rule to bar the
use of those statements from the prosecutor's case-in-chief.'"
The Supreme Court continued this line of reasoning in Oregon v.
Hass."6 Hass represents a case where the police openly violated Miranda by
refusing to allow the suspect to call his attorney after the warnings were ad-
ministered and the suspect made a specific request for counsel. 27 Neverthe-
less, the confession was held admissible for impeachment purposes." The
118. Seeid. at466.
119. See id. at 470.
120. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
121. See id. at 226.
122. See id. at 226 n.2.
123. The Court agreed it was onerous to simply allow unlawfully obtained statements
into evidence, but it was equally onerous to disallow use of a prior statement and allow the
commission of perjury. See id. (citing Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954)).
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723 (1975).
127. See id. at 715-16. After being read his rights, defendant realized he "was in a lot of
trouble," and requested that he be able to call an attorney. Id. at 715.
128. The Court recognized that its holding might provide an incentive for police to
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Harris and Hass rationale correctly safeguards constitutional rights, but does
not allow the defendant to lie his way out of a conviction.
B. The Supreme Court's Reaffirmation of Miranda
In 1993, the Supreme Court showed its continued support of the
Miranda doctrine, in Withrow v. Williams.'29 Justice Souter, stated that
"'[p]rophylactic' though it may be, in protecting a defendants Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination, Miranda safeguards 'a fundamen-
tal trial right."" 3 The issue in Williams centered around whether the rule in,
Stone v. Powell,3' was applicable to federal habeas corpus actions. 3z The
Stone rule states that "when a State has given a full and fair chance to litigate
a Fourth Amendment claim, federal habeas review is not available, to a state
prisoner alleging that his conviction rests on evidence obtained through an
unconstitutional search or seizure.' ' 33
The Supreme Court disagreed that the Stone rule should apply to all
federal habeas review actions." The Court concluded that unless the prose-
cution can establish that warnings were given and that a waiver occurred, the
subsequent use of confessions in violation of Miranda deprives the suspect
of his right to a fair trial. 35
Similarly, in Minnick v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court, again, placed
its stamp of approval on the Miranda doctrine.136 Before being questioned by
two F.B.I. agents, Minnick was read the familiar Miranda rights. Minnick
later requested an attorney, and at that point the interrogation stopped.'37
openly defy Miranda's requirements, but the Court dismissed this potentiality as being purely
a "speculative" concern. Id. Based on similar reasoning, the California Supreme Court re-
cently held that purposeful violation of the Miranda warnings does not render statements ob-
tained by police inadmissible for impeachment purposes. See People v. Peevy, 17 Cal. 4th
1184, 1196 (1998).:
129. 507 U.S. 680 (1993). The defendant in this case was charged and later convicted of
two counts of first-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a fel-
ony. The sentence was two concurrent life sentences. Defendant argued that his rights were
violated because he was not administered the Miranda warnings until forty minutes after he
had made incriminating statements. See id. at 684.
130. Id. at 691 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990)).
131. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
132. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 682-83 (1993).
133. Id. at 682. The Supreme Court concluded that the costs of applying the exclusionary
rule in cases involving collateral review outweighed any advantages from applying it in those
collateral actions. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 489-95.
134. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 687-88.
135. See id. at 690, 692-93.
136. See Minnick v. Mississippi 498 U.S. 146, 152 (1990). Robert Minnick and James
Dyess escaped from a jail in Mississippi, and a day later broke into a mobile home to search
for weapons. They were discovered by the homeowner and a friend, both of whom were shot
and killed. The two escapees fled to Mexico and four months after the murders, Minnick was
arrested in Lemon Grove, California. See id. at 148.
137. See id. at 149.
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Minnick was appointed counsel who met with him two or three times.'
On Monday of the following week, Deputy Sheriff J.C. Denham of
Clark County, Mississippi, was in San Diego to question Minnick in connec-
tion with the murders.'39 This interrogation was conducted without Minnick's
attorney present." The Supreme Court held that Miranda's protection
against interrogations taking place without the suspect's attorney present, is
not terminated when the suspect consults with his attorney. 4' Rather, the
suspect has a right to have his attorney present during questioning, and the
fact that consultation has taken place does not eliminate Miranda's require-
ment that counsel be present before interrogation is reinitiated.'
It seems evident from the holdings in Withrow and Minnick, that the Su-
preme Court is unwilling to completely abolish the Miranda doctrine. 3 The
Supreme Court has stated the reason for its adherence to the Miranda doc-
trine is "to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agen-
cies and courts to follow. As we have stressed on numerous occasions,
'[o]ne of the principal advantages' of Miranda is the ease and clarity of its
application."'" 4
IV. ARGUMENTS THAT SUPPORT MAINTAINING MIRANDA
A. Public Policies Behind Miranda
In addition to its constitutional basis, Miranda rests on sound public
policy. In order for a government to remain strong, it must be the ultimate
and consummate respecter of law. 5 Justice Brandeis put it this way:
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials
shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the
citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be im-
138. See id.
139. See id. Minnick contended, at trial, that his jailors told him he had to talk with Den-
ham and that he "could not refuse." Id.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 150-51. The Minnick Court concluded that the right of counsel is not
based solely on the Sixth Amendment grounds adhered to in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477 (1981), but also on Fifth Amendment grounds adhered to in Miranda. See Minnick, 498
U.S. at 152.
142. See Minnick, 498 U.S. at 152-53. The Court confirmed that this rule is intended to
act as a check against police misconduct even though the Miranda rights have been adminis-
tered. The protection is created by counsel's presence who can testify of any improprieties.
See id.
143. See generally Withrow, 507 U.S. 680 (Supreme Court declined to extend the Stone
rule to every criminal habeas review case on the premise that the Miranda Warnings safe-
guard fundamental trial rights); Minnick, 498 U.S. 146 (concluding that a suspect's right to
counsel is not based solely on the Sixth Amendment grounds adhered to in Edwards v. Ari-
zona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), but also on Fifth Amendment grounds adhered to in Miranda).
144. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 680 (1988) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U.S. 420,430 (1984)).
145. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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perilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the
potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole
people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become law
unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of
the criminal law the end justifies the means.., would bring terrible retri-
bution.
4 6
The Supreme Court agrees that allowing police to engage in question-
able or outright unlawful practices will be the means of providing an incen-
tive for all citizens to simply ignore, or worse, take the law into their own
hands. "7 Requiring law enforcement agents to give persons in custody notice
of their rights prior to questioning builds a positive public perception of law
enforcement and increases trust in that institution. Opponents of Miranda
claim it creates a sophisticated class of criminals who know exactly what
their rights are, and as a result the likelihood of obtaining confessions is
greatly reduced.'
It has also been recognized, however, that during the same time period
since Miranda was decided, technology and sophistication have changed law
enforcement as well.'49 In fact, the doctrine is so prevalent that general law
enforcement practices have changed to conform with it, and to such an ex-
tent, that it is hard to conceive of any difficulty, or even any unwillingness
on the part of police to give the Miranda warnings.5 '
Indeed, our entire system of criminal justice hinges on the ideal that
suspects are presumed innocent until proven guilty.' In order to sustain this
ideal our criminal justice system models an accusatorial approach rather than
an inquisitorial one.5 An accusatorial system requires a definite accuser and
146. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,485 (1928).
147. See id. at 485.
148. See Gilbert G. Gallegos, Voluntary Confessions Law, CONG. TESTIMONY, May 13,
1999, available in 1999 WL 16947867.
149. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 695 (1993).
150. See id. (citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 663 (1984) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring in judgement in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.
291, 304 (1980) (Burger, C.J., concurring in judgement)) ("'meaning of Miranda has become
reasonably clear and law enforcement practices have adjusted to its strictures'). Id. This
point was further bolstered during an interview with Mark Gardner, the Student Bar Associa-
tion President at California Western School of Law, who prior to law school was a Police
Sergeant with the Takoma Park Police Department, in Takoma Park, Maryland. During his six
and a half years as a police officer, Mr. Gardner related that he was always trained to use and
scrupulously adhere to Miranda. He said that the rule was clear and easy to administer, and
provided a measure of protection for the officers when subsequently faced with claims of
misconduct. In his opinion, and from his perspective as a prior police officer, Miranda is the
safest route to follow. Interview with Mark Gardner, Student Bar Association President, Cali-
fornia Western School of Law, in San Diego, Cal. (July 28, 1999).
151. See generally Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privi-
lege Against Compulsory Self-hzcrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part I), 53
OHIO ST. L.J. 101 (1992).
152. The privilege against self-incrimination embodies "many of our fundamental values
and most noble aspirations... our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial
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knowledge by the defendant of the charges against him. 3 A defendant is
presumed innocent until proven guilty before a jury in a public trial." In
contrast, an inquisitorial approach allows a trial to proceed based simply on
suspicion alone.5
Regardless of what the Supreme Court has done since Miranda was de-
cided, it is noteworthy to mention that the Supreme Court consistently ap-
plies Miranda's holding when determining the admissibility of confessions
in state court proceedings.56 This is critical because the Supreme Court can
only "bind the state courts with rules that are designed to implement and
protect constitutional rights."'57 Yet, the Supreme Court has also announced
that the Miranda warnings are not constitutionally protected, but rather,
merely prophylactic in nature.' Despite this pronouncement by the Supreme
Court, scholars and practitioners believe Miranda has enough of a constitu-
tional basis that doing away with Miranda would essentially do away with
Fifth Amendment rights. 59 While Miranda warnings may not be constitu-
tionally protected, Fifth Amendment rights are, and eliminating Miranda
warnings as they have evolved in American jurisprudence has the danger of
seriously impeding them."
system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by in-
humane treatment and abuses .... " Withrow, 507 U.S. at 692 (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n of New York Harbor, 384 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)).
153. See Herman, supra note 151, at 106.
154. See id.
155. Often times the accused did not know the identity of the accuser, nor the charges
because the entire process was shrouded in secrecy. See id. at 106.
156. See James K. Robinson, Voluntary Confessions Law, CONG. TESTIONY, May 13,
1999, available in 1999 WL 16947870.
157. Robinson, supra note 156 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
158. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654 (explaining that Miranda's proscribed
set of warnings are merely prophylactic). See also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444-46
(1974). The Supreme Court explained that the Miranda warnings are only prophylactic, and
not constitutionally protected rights. In Tucker, defendant was charged with rape and battery
based on the testimony of a friend, whose identity was disclosed to police through a confes-
sion obtained after an incomplete set of warnings were given. The defendant told the officers
he understood the charge against him, that he did not want an attorney, and that he understood
his rights. See id. at 436. The Tucker Court concluded that the defendant's statements were
not taken in violation of his constitutional rights, but that police conduct "departed only from
the prophylactic standards ... laid down by this Court in Miranda to safeguard that privilege."
Id. at 446.
159.
Paul Smith, following the case for the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, said the federal statute should be invalidated. 'There's enough of a con-
stitutional aspect to Miranda that Congress cannot take away the rights it pro-
vided,' Smith said. 'If you don't force police to give the warnings, you effectively
are taking away the rights.'
Carelli, supra note 18, at A19.
160. One commentator suggests
that current developments in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence actually encourage
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CONCLUSION
One thing is certain, the debate between Miranda and Section 3501 will
continue until the Supreme Court clarifies which of the two approaches will
be the governing rule in America. More important however, is upon which
rule will the Supreme Court place its imprimatur? A wealth of scholarly ef-
fort has been spent on both sides of the Miranda debate. The conclusion
reached by this article is this that Miranda is still a viable doctrine and
should be maintained as the standard by which confessions are evaluated for
admissibility.
The danger of abandoning Miranda's "irrebuttable presumption" in fa-
vor of Section 3501's voluntariness test is that it is unclear just what warn-
ings are absolutely required under Section 3501. For well over three dec-
ades, the rule has been clear under Miranda that all of the proscribed set of
warnings must be given when police place a suspect in custody for the pur-
pose of interrogation. By contrast, the risk of inconsistent results looms large
under the "totality of the circumstances" approach of Section 3501. For in
one instance, the lack of warning to a suspect of his right to consult with
counsel may not prove critical in the court's analysis, and the confession
may be admitted without this .important warning ever being given. Yet, a to-
tally different result may obtain in a factually similar case because a differ-
ent court finds it critical that a suspect was not advised of the right to consult
with an attorney.
This confusion need not even exist because Miranda is a workable doc-
trine, which has been properly circumscribed by the very Court which cre-
ated it. The limited use of confessions to impeach the suspect is proper. The
Framers of the Constitution intended the Fifth Amendment Privilege to be a
means of protection against a suspect being compelled to provide evidence
of his own guilt, and not to commit perjury. Adherence to Miranda's holding
safeguards a person's Constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment. At
the same time, Harris and its progeny provide an appropriate balance of in-
terests by disallowing an accused, in a criminal trial, to make a mockery of
the judicial system by committing perjury without impunity.
law enforcement officials to violate the standards of conduct imposed upon them
by the Miranda decision, and that... [t]his problem can be solved only if the Su-
preme Court reconstitutionalizes Miranda, at least to the extent necessary to en-
force those restraints on state on federal officials that it initially found crucial to
properly safeguarding an individual's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. Failing this, the Court should cease promulgating prophylactic rules
that it cannot or will not enforce, both to avoid losing institutional prestige and to
curb the shift in constitutional interpretive authority from itself to the executive
branches of state and federal governments.
Klein, supra note 61, at 418.
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Therefore, based on these proper Supreme Court limitations, a general
prosecutorial favoritism toward Miranda, the F.B.I.'s long-standing adher-
ence to the warnings, and the ease of administering Miranda, the Supreme
Court should hold that Miranda is the appropriate standard and not Section
3501.
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